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Abstract
This paper analyses the impact of subsidies to promote Italian joint ventures (JVs) with firms in
LDC and transition economies. The empirical analysis is carried out on a unique dataset of 172
JVs interviewed during 1998 by means of a closed-answer qualitative-quantitative
questionnaire. The main finding of the study is that although there is a significant deadweight
component in incentive policy, subsidised firms are significantly more likely to grow.
Moreover, JVs comprising new firms (which need to grow to survive) also achieve a higher-
than-average employment performance, and so too do (labour intensive) JVs motivated by the
search for lower labour costs, and JVs in East European countries.
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21. Introduction
As of the end of the eighties, the relative political and economic stability achieved by some
Least Developed Countries (LDC), together with liberalisation processes in Central and
Eastern European countries, brought significant acceleration in foreign direct investments
(FDI) on a global level.  The growth of these investments was very rapid between 1992 and
1995 (18%, 16% and 28% respectively in ’93, 94 and ’95), followed by a slowdown (-0.7% in
1996) due mainly to a net decrease in investments made by EU member states (-4.6% in 1996).
During the first half of the nineties, Italian foreign investments partly reflected the expansion
characteristic of other European nations. The number of employees of foreign firms with
Italian shareholders increased from 244,188 in 1986 to 606,266 at the end of 1997, and most
of this increase occurred in LDC or in transition countries, where 53% of such employees were
recorded in 1997 (see Cominotti, Mariotti and Mutinelli, 1999). If total foreign investments are
considered, however, there was still a gap compared with the three other major European
countries: the United Kingdom invested 3.5 times as much as Italy, Germany 2.5 times as
much and France twice as much (in 1994 Italy contributed 3.5% to total world capital stock
invested overseas: see Prometeia - Comit 1998). However, the capacity of Italian firms to
invest abroad was nevertheless considerable if investments in LDCs and transition economies
are considered alone. For example, Italy (together with Austria) is the third largest investor in
Central and East European countries after Germany and the USA (see Mutinelli and Piscitello,
1997).
This paper analyses the impact of the two main financial instruments for the promotion of
Italian joint ventures (JVs) with firms in LDC and transition economies: subsidised credit
provided by the Foreign Office in accordance with the law on development aid (art. 7 Law
49/87) and funds provided by Simest and Mediocredito Centrale in accordance with Law 100
of 1990 (this is officially a Public Development Finance Corporation, while in practice the
funding is equivalent to subsidised credit). The context for the application of these instruments
- which essentially provide subsidised credit for the financing of investments - is significant as
regards both the total volume of Italian investment and the volume of the facilities provided.
For example, approximately. 350 JV projects were approved by Simest and the Foreign Office
at the end of 1998: 300 by Simest and 50 by the Foreign Office.
Given that the total number of foreign firms with Italian shareholders in the LDCs and
transition economies amounted to approximately 1,000 at the beginning of that year (source:
National Committee for the Economy and Labour, CNEL), around 35% of Italian investments
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of the present authors (Barba Navaretti, 1997) showed that around 30% of total capital
invested by beneficiary firms was subsidised, and that the subsidy generated a reduction of
between 10% and 20% in the total cost of the investment.
The aims and means of subsidising are a matter of controversy.  When credit facilities
substitute for funds obtainable on the open market for the financing of investments which
would take place in any case, there is simply a deadweight effect, i.e. a net transfer of
resources from taxpayers to subsidised firms (see Hansson and Stuart, 1989; Wren, 1996).  In
this regard, a descriptive analysis by Barba Navaretti (1997) has shown that the Italian firms
which have benefited from credit facilities have been mainly large-scale ones, i.e. those which
should not encounter problems in finding finance on the market.  By contrast, any market
failure ought to involve small and medium-sized firms, since these find investing abroad more
difficult than large ones because of financial and managerial limitations (see Buckley 1979 and
1989).  This preliminary evidence corroborates the suspicion that facilities granted to Italian
JVs might have a deadweight component.
This paper conducts more detailed analysis of the impact of subsidies by using information
from a study of a sample of JVs financed by the promotional instruments described above.
Comparison between data relative to these JVs and data on other Italian JVs in developing
nations which have not received subsidised credit has made it possible to study the role
performed by incentives. More specifically, it has enabled us to answer the following questions.
To what extent has the investment really been induced by the availability of the subsidy?  Are
subsidised firms different from non-subsidised ones?  Have the subsidised firms performed
better than the non-subsidised ones?  The answers to these questions shed light on whether the
subsidies effectively generate investments which otherwise would not be made, and whether
the resources are really devoted to investments with high growth potential.  A total of 172 JVs
– either set up ex novo r deriving from the purchase/takeover of existing plants by Italian
firms in LDCs or transition economies – are analysed.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the data used and presents
descriptive statistics for subsidised firm profiles, especially as regards the reasons for their
decision to set up a JV; Section 3 presents a probit analysis of the relation between the
probability of being a subsidised firm, irrespective of whether it had either applied for a
particular subsidy scheme or, if so, whether it had or had not been admitted to the scheme, an
the firm profile; Section 4 examines whether the existence of the subsidy or other company
4features are decisive factors in the performance of Italian JVs abroad; finally, Section 5 draws
some conclusions.
2. Data and descriptive statistics
The empirical analysis is carried out on a unique dataset of 172 JVs interviewed in 1998 by
means of a closed-answer qualitative-quantitative questionnaire (Table 1). 134 of these JVs
concerned industries in which Italy is specialised (mechanical engineering, textiles, clothing),
while the remaining 38 cases involved firms from a mix of industries. Some of the JVs had
exploited the credit facilities provided by Law 100 and Art. 7 of Law 49.  In order to evaluate
the impact of the subsidy, it was necessary to compare these JVs with a control subsample: i.e.
with JVs starting up independently and without subsidies. In our case, 34% of the sample
consisted of subsidised firms, while 66% were unsubsidised. This combination reflects the
incidence of subsidies in the population of Italian investors in LDCs and transition economies
(see Section 1).
Table 1: Composition of the sample
TOTAL SUBSIDISED NON-SUBSIDISED
172 FIRMS 59 FIRMS 113 FIRMS
MECHANICAL
ENGINEERING?
42% 25% 50%
TEXTILES 10% 10% 11%
CLOTHING 26% 14% 32%
OTHER INDUSTRIES 22% 51%  7%
EAST EUROPE 31% 41% 26%
LATIN AMERICA 17% 14% 19%
FAR EAST 30% 27% 31%
OTHER 22% 18% 24%
The JVs were located in almost all areas of the world, although many of them were
concentrated in Central-Eastern Europe (53 cases, equal to 31%) and the Far East (India,
China and the Far East: 51 cases, equal to 30%). Given that the investments considered were
generally new, this geographic distribution reflects recent trends in foreign Italian investment:
between 1986 and 1998, investment in Central-Eastern Europe grew from 0.6% to 19.9% of
the total number of overseas firms with Italian shareholders (including firms in industrialised
nations), while that in Asia grew from 7.6% to 13% (see Barba Navaretti, 1997) .For two
reasons - the availability of only partially complete data and the need to obtain a sample which
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reference population - it has not been possible to balance the two sub-samples from an industry
and geographical point of view.  The firms received a questionnaire designed to gather
information about the company profile (turnover, employees, investment, motivation, type and
effectiveness of subsidy, etc.) relative to both the parent company and the JV.
The first question considered was whether the incentives generated additional investments
in developing nations. If they did not, the companies concerned were using credit facilities to
finance investments that they would in any case have made at market cost; thus the incentives
were merely the transfer of resources from the general public to the owners of the firms
(deadweight effect). The question was addressed in two stages: first we asked the firms some
questions directly; then we carried out a descriptive and a regression analysis to determine
whether the subsidised firms had different characteristics from the non-subsidised firms. Table
2 gives the frequencies of the replies to the questions put to the 58 subsidised firms regarding
the influence of the subsidy on their decision to invest. The questions were broken down into
several points.
Table 2: Subsidy and decision to invest
Simest Law 49
Yes Partially No Tot Yes Partially No Tot
The decision to invest was influenced by: % % % % % % % %
Availability of financial facilities 4.5 29.5 65.9 10013.3 40 46.67 100
Reduced cost of investment 2.3 45.5 52.3 100 0 46.67 53.3 100
Was a developing nation chosen because of the
availability of credit facilities?
2.3 32.6 65.1 1006.67 40 53.3 100
Was the JV chosen because of the availability of
credit facilities?
9.3 30.2 60.5 1006.67 33.3 60 100
Was your competitiveness influenced by the
availability of credit facilities?
6.8 27.3 65.9 100 0 43.0 57 100
We first asked whether the decision to invest was influenced by the availability of credit
facilities (in the case of firms with a limited ability to raise capital on the market) and by the
availability of the subsidy, which reduces the cost of financing. The results were rather
disquieting: in all cases, the majority of firms replied ‘no’, and over 90% replied ‘no’ or
‘partially’. This suggests that the firms could have found money on the market (reply regarding
the availability of credit) and that the expected yield from the investment was such to repay the
market cost of credit (reply regarding the reduced cost of credit).
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in a fully-owned subsidiary, and to invest in a developing nation rather than in an industrialised
one. These aspects are important, in that the aim of the subsidy is partly to foster the
development of the host nation. The formation of a JV rather than a subsidiary permits greater
interaction with local partners.  Again, a large majority of firms believed that the subsidies
were useless: that is, they stated that they would have invested in a developing nation and in a
JV even without the facilities.
Finally, we asked whether the subsidy had significantly influenced the firm’s
competitiveness. The majority of replies were ‘no’ in this case as well, which confirms that the
expected profit margins on the investment were such that the reduction in the cost of the
investment resulting from the subsidy was insignificant.
These results suggested that the subsidy was a mere transfer of resources from taxpayers to
the firms, and that it did not effectively help to compensate for market failures which might
hinder investment activity.  This aspect can be analysed more thoroughly by comparing the
characteristics of the subsidised JVs against those of JVs financed in accordance with market
conditions. The more similar the two groups of firms, the more valid the hypothesis of a
deadweight effect becomes.
As a first step, we describe the motivational factors that prompt investment overseas.  An
initial examination of these factors (table 3) yields interesting and surprising information on the
factors the determine the decision to form a JV with a foreign partner. With subsidised firms
separated from non-subsidised ones (table 3), the first feature to emerge is that the most
important motive for the former is the opportunity to increase or maintain their presence in
foreign markets.  For non-subsidised firms, the most important factor is reduced labour costs,
although the market is still significantly important.
Of the other factors considered, subsidised firms rated the income deriving from sale of
technology, brands, plant, and licences in third place (immediately after reduced labour costs).
This factor was rated last but one in importance (just above access to locally-available skills,
technology, and know-how) by the non-subsidised firms (these results are not surprising, given
the low or medium/low technological level of the host nations).
Overall, the motives of the subsidised and non-subsidised firms do not seem significantly
different, although there is a tendency for the subsidised firms to display more progressive
motivation (market and technology).  From this particular point of view, therefore, the subsidy
seems to perform a positive discriminating function.
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standard deviations in brackets): subsidised and non-subsidised firms*
DETERMINING FACTOR TOTAL (151) SUBSIDISED (54) NON SUBSID.  (97)
Market 2.93 (1.29) 3.06 (1.22) 2.87 (1.33)
Labour costs 2.84 (1.17) 2.57 (1.21) 2.99 (1.13)
Barriers 1.93 (1.10) 2.06 (1.22) 1.87 (1.03)
Strategy 1.87 (1.06) 2.04 (1.20) 1.77 (0.97)
Input 1.85 (1.16) 2.06 (1.20) 1.74 (1.12)
Technology 1.83 (1.12) 2.26 (1.17) 1.60 (1.03)
Skills 1.54 (1.07) 1.70 (1.21) 1.45 (0.98)
*Note: 151 firms are included, not 172, because 21 did not reply in full to the questions on motivation.
The questionnaire items on motivation summarised in the table are the following: what motives caused you to
decide to invest abroad?
- chance to increase or maintain foreign market penetration (market)
- income deriving from sale of technology, brands, plant, licences (technology)
- guaranteed cheap supply of raw materials/semi processed goods (input)
- reduced labour costs (labour costs)
- need to find loopholes in trade, technical or legal barriers (barriers)
- access to locally-available skills, technology, and knowhow (skills)
- reply to similar moves by competitors (strategy)
3. Who benefits from the subsidy?
The next step is to analyse the differences between the subsidised and non-subsidised firms
in more detail. The aim of this exercise is to define the «ideal type» of the subsidised firm,
irrespective of whether it had either applied for a particular subsidy scheme or, if so, whether it
had or had not been admitted to the scheme. Using a probit analysis, we estimated the
following model:
(1) Pi,j,k(SUBS=1) = a1 + a2 Xi + a3 Yj + a4 Zk + e
(1) enabled us to estimate the probability that JV i set up by the Italian firm j n nation k is
subsidised in relation to a series of characteristics of the JV itself (X), the Italian firm (Y) and
the host nation (Z).  Table 4 describes the variables used and table 5 gives the regression
results.  The choice of variables used in the multiple regression is the result of a selection
procedure that excluded all the characteristics not theoretically associated with the perception
of the subsidy and all the characteristics non-significantly linked with the dependent variable in
the simple one variable regression. The number of observations was reduced from 172 to 104
because not all the questionnaires were answered in full.
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Variable Description
SUBSIDY Dummy = 1 if financing is subsidised
               = 0 if financed by market
GROWTH Growth rate of per-capita income (1995) of host nation
PER-CAPITA GNP absolute per-capita GNP in 1995 (OECD data) of host
nation
DEAST Dummy  East European nations
SHARE Share of JV held by the parent company in 1997
LOG EMPLOYEES Parent company employees logarithm
MKT value attributed by the firm to market penetration as
motivating factor
LC value attributed by the firm to reduced labour costs as
motivating factor
EMPTURN Labour intensity (employees/turnover) of the JVcompared
with the parent firm
As regards the host nation, we considered the income growth rate, average per-capita GNP
and a geographic and cultural proximity dummy (DEAST).  The lower the per-capita income
and its growth, the lower the nation's ability to attract new investments, and therefore the
greater the importance of the subsidy in redirecting foreign investments towards development
objectives.  This proves not to be the case, in fact: both variables exerted little influence, with
GROWTH having a significant and positive influence on the likelihood of obtaining a subsidy:
in other words, subsidised firms do not seem to be directed towards countries different from
those which attract investments by companies using finance provided by the market.
Another important factor when considering the development of the host nation is the share
of capital provided by the local partner. The higher this share, the more local workers can take
part in management of the firm and accelerate the process of know-how transfer. The
coefficient of this variable had the expected sign and was partially significant.  In this case the
subsidy seems to have been beneficial to the host nation.
As regards the parent company, we may imagine that a typical market failure would be
linked with the size of the investing firm (higher finance costs and lack of managerial skills: see
Paragraph 1). In fact, the LOG EMPLOYEES variable entered the Probit estimate with the
expected negative coefficient and was highly significant. The subsidy seems therefore to
compensate for market failure linked with small size. However, this result should be treated
with caution.  If one reasons - as one should in these estimates - in terms of the number of
firms with credit facilities, it is true that many of them are medium-small. If, however, one
9reasons in terms of investment volume, a large majority of the credit facilities go to large firms
(see Barba Navaretti, 1997).
Table 5: Probability of being a subsidised firm
Dependent Variable:
SUBSIDY
(a) (b) (c)
CONSTANT 1.82***
(0.70)
2.18***
(0.79)
2.05***
(0.80)
GROWTH 0.04**
(0.03)
0.04**
(0.03)
0.04**
(0.03)
PER-CAPITA GNP 0.00
(0.00)
9.19E-05
(0.00)
7.16E-05
(0.00)
DEST -0.51
(0.35)
-0.544
(0.35)
-0.49
(0.37)
SHARE -0,01*
(0.01)
-0.01*
(0,01)
-0.01*
(0.01)
LOG EMPLOYEES -0.37***
(0.10)
-0.36***
(0.10)
-0.37***
(0.10)
MKT - -0.09
(0.12)
-
LC - - -0.04
(0.14)
EMPTURN -0.74
(0.79)
-0.799
(0.81)
-0.81
(0.80)
Pseudo-R2 0.18 0.189 0.185
Log-likelihood
Observations
-52.11
104
-51.10
104
-51.34
103
Note: Standard error in brackets; *  =  90% significant;  **  = 95% significant; *** = 99% significant;
Finally, the variables linked with the strategy pursued by the firm through the JV were not
significant. The fact that a firm was motivated by market-seeking and/or (labour) cost-reducing
was not reflected in a higher (or lower) probability of obtaining a subsidy. This result means
that caution is necessary when drawing conclusions on the basis of the descriptive comparisons
given in table 3. Similarly, a strategy of decentralisation of labour-intensive activities
(EMPTURN) did not discriminate.
4. Subsidy and the performance of subsidised firms
A further issue investigated was the extent to which investment promotion programmes are
able to select investments with good growth potential.  On the basis of the data gathered by
means of the questionnaires, the performance of the firms studied can be measured either in
terms of turnover or in terms of employees.  We chose the latter for two reasons. Firstly, the
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data on the JVs' turnover suffered from intra-firm flows and complex internal price dynamics;
secondly, the Italian firms had invested in countries with different tax systems, which may have
influenced turnover data (see King and Fullerton (1984)). We thus decided to take as the proxy
for JV performance the annual employment growth rate between the initial year and 1997.
The regression analysis followed a stepwise procedure, so that the JV features (size, size of
parent firm, industry sector, geographical area, host country’s GNP, JV capital shares,
existence of subsidy, motivation listed in table 3) were evaluated according to their impact on
the JV's employment growth. The selection of significant variables and necessary checks (fixed
effects) led to definition of the following model, which was estimated using White's correction
for heteroskedasticity.
(2)   DEMP = b0 + b1DSUBS + b2LC + b3DACQUI + b 4 DMEC + b5DTEX +
b6DCLO + b7DEAST + b8DLAT + b9DFAR + u
Table 6 describes the variables used and table 7 gives the regression results.
Three estimates were made (Table 7): in the first, (a), only industry specific effects were
checked for; in the second, (b), geographical areas were also considered, to include the impact
of the economic cycle and institutional features of the host nations on JV employment growth
patterns; in the third, (c), the LC variable was omitted. The number of observations was
reduced from 172 to 67 (70 in (c)), mainly because of the exclusion of initiatives for which it
was not possible to calculate the annual growth rate of employment due to a lack of data or
because they started up in 1997. The diagnostics of the three estimates was satisfactory, with
acceptable values for both the R squared and the F test.
The results highlight a possible positive role of the subsidy, which has a highly significant
coefficient in all the estimates. The selection procedure for firms entitled to a subsidy thus
seems to identify those with the best growth potential (the annual employment growth rate is
28% if all 72 firms for which the figure is available are considered, and rises to 64% when one
considers the subset of 30 subsidised firms). Nevertheless, the fact that the subsidised firms
were those with the best dynamics reinforces the suspicion that market financing and
subsidised financing are interchangeable.  Indeed, it is likely that performance in terms of
growth is positively related to the probability that the firm is able to finance its foreign
investments on market conditions. This result therefore lends itself to two interpretations: on
the one hand, the presence of a subsidy seems to increase the likelihood of employment growth
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in the JV and therefore increases the benefit to the host nation; on the other hand, the good
performance displayed by the subsidised firms suggests that the subsidy may contain a
deadweight component (the firm could have obtained the same results with market finance).
Tabella 6: Key to variables used in estimating model (2)
Variable Description
DEMP annual employment growth rate in the JV between startup
and 1997
DSUBS dummy = 1 if the firm obtained a subsidy,
0 otherwise
LC value attributed by the firm to the reduction in labour
costs as motivating factor
DACQUI dummy = 1 if the JV was started up by the takeover of an
existing firm or 0 if it was a new firm
DMEC dummy = 1 if the JV is in the mechanical industry,
0 otherwise
DTEX dummy = 1 if the JV is in the textile industry,
0 otherwise
DCLO dummy = 1 if the JV is in the clothing industry,
0 otherwise
DEAST dummy = 1 if the JV is in Eastern Europe,
0 otherwise
DLAT dummy = 1 if the JV is in Latin America,
0 otherwise
DFAR dummy = 1 if the JV is in the Far East,
0 otherwise.
The negative, significant (even if only at the 95% level), coefficient for the DACQUI
variable indicates better employment prospects for the JVs which give rise to new firms,
compared with those that result from the takeover of existing firms.  This result is consistent
with the findings in the literature on the post-entry performance of firms (see for example
Audretsch et al., 1999): newly-formed firms are usually smaller than the best minimum size for
the sector and therefore survive only if they manage to grow rapidly during the first years of
activity.
The comparison between sub (b) and sub (a) estimates indicates weakness in the
significance of the LC variable when the geographical dummies are included; indeed, the value
of the relative coefficient in estimate (b) is smaller that that in estimate (a) and only significant
at the 90% level. Overall, the fact that firms started up (or taken over) as a result of the need
to reduce labour costs have a greater tendency to grow (in terms of employees) than do those
which give lesser importance to this motive is to some extent supported by the data.  This
result is not surprising, given that a JV started up mainly in order to reduce labour costs would
presumably be characterised by labour-intensive processes.
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Table 7: Determinants of employment growth in the JVs
Dependent Variable
EMP
(a) (b) (c)
CONSTANT -0.55*
(0.35)
-0.44
(0.37)
-0.11
(0.21)
DSUBS 0.74***
(0.24)
0.73***
(0.24))
0.69***
(0.22)
LC 0.17***
(0.07)
0.10*
(0.06)
-
DACQUI -0.26**
(0.13)
-0.39**
(0.17)
-0.43***
(0.15)
DMEC 0.37*
(0.27)
0.43*
(0.26)
0.39*
(0.23)
DTEX -0.05
(0.25)
0.01
(0.26)
0.04
(0.23)
DCLO 0.10
(0.26)
0.16
(0.28)
0.26
(0.28)
DEAST - 0.32**
(0.17)
0.30**
(0.16)
DLAT - -0.02
(0.16)
-0.07
(0.14)
DFAR - -0.26**
(0.16)
-0.34**
(0.15)
R square 0.30 0.38 0.36
R adjusted square 0.23 0.28 0.27
F Test 4.26*** 3.85*** 4.23***
Observations 67 67 70
Note: Standard error in brackets, *  =  90% significant;  **  =  95% significant; *** =  99% significant;
estimates have been corrected for heteroskedacity (White’s correction).
As regards fixed sector effects, only the mechanical industry dummy has a relatively
significant, positive coefficient in all the estimates.  This result derives from an increased
demand for capital goods in the LDCs and transition economies.
Of the area dummies, only that for East Europe has a significant (though only at the 95%
level) positive coefficient influencing the employment growth of the JVs. The availability of
low-cost skilled labour may be important when interpreting this result, given that it is the most
attractive feature of transition economies.
5. Conclusions
The main results of this study can be summarised as follows:
1) Most firms declare that the subsidy was not crucial to their decision to invest, or in the way
they invested abroad, which reveals a significant deadweight component in incentive policy.
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2) Smaller investing firms (with limited access to capital markets) have a higher probability of
being included in the category of subsidised firms, so that the subsidy seems partly to
compensate for market failure.
3) If the JV’s performance is measured in terms of employment growth, subsidised firms are
significantly more likely to grow.  This result has a twofold interpretation: on the one hand, the
presence of the subsidy seems to increase the JV’s chances of employment growth, thereby
heightening the benefit for the host nation; on the other hand, the good performance of
subsidised firms increases the suspicion that the subsidy may contain a deadweight component
(the firm is healthy and could probably have obtained similar results with financing obtained on
the open market).
4) The JVs comprising new firms (which need to grow to survive) also achieve a higher-than-
average employment performance, as do the (labour intensive) JVs motivated by the search for
lower labour costs, and the JVs in East European countries (attractive from an employment
point of view because of their endowments of skilled but cheap labour).
As to future directions for research, the most interesting is distinguishing between the
beneficial effect of the subsidy on performance and the deadweight effect, the aim being to
measure their relative importance. To this end, the construction of new ad hocdatas ts is
required; databases with a panel structure and containing information on firms involved in joint
ventures gathered before and after the subsidy has been obtained.
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